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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Ms. Ibarra raised three issues on appeal: that the prosecutor committed misconduct by
eliciting improper opinion testimony about Ms. Ibarra’s guilt, that the district court had allowed
improper propensity evidence to be admitted, and that the restitution award was not supported by
sufficient evidence.
In regard to the prosecutorial misconduct issue, the State argues that this Court should
consider the prosecutor’s two questions in context, but then proceeds to analyze them
independent of one another. Its arguments as to both of those questions are not consistent with
the applicable precedents. In fact, the State actually concedes that such questions would usually
be inappropriate.
In regard to the propensity evidence issue, the State’s point about the evidence being
relevant to the possession of paraphernalia charge regardless of whether it was relevant to the
charge of possession of a controlled substance is well-taken, and Ms. Ibarra would withdraw that
issue.
The State does not challenge the merits of Ms. Ibarra’s argument that there was not
sufficient evidence to support the restitution award. Rather, it only argues that the sufficiency
issue was not properly raised for the first time on appeal and that the proper remedy if the
evidence was insufficient is to remand the case for a hearing. Both of those arguments are
contrary to the applicable court rules and precedent.
This Court should vacate Ms. Ibarra’s judgments of conviction and remand these cases
for a new trial. Alternatively, it should vacate the portions of the restitution order which are not
supported by substantial evidence.

1

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Ms. Ibarra’s Appellant’s Brief.

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

2

ISSUES
I.

Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct by eliciting opinion testimony about
Ms. Ibarra’s guilt in regard to the firearm charge.

II.

Whether the district court erred by admitting propensity evidence when the State failed to
provide the written notice required under I.R.E. 404(b).

III.

Whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering restitution which was solely
based on the prosecutor’s unsworn statement, not on sufficient evidence.
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ARGUMENT
I.
The Prosecutor Committed Misconduct By Eliciting Opinion Testimony About Ms. Ibarra’s
Guilt In Regard To The Firearm Charge
A.

Two Questions Posed By The Prosecutor, Reviewed In Context, Were Improper And
Constituted Misconduct
At trial, the prosecutor asked Officer Duke two related questions – whether he would

arrest “someone” if he believed they were innocent, and whether he would have arrested
Ms. Ibarra if he did not believe she had access to the gun in question. (Tr., Vol.2, p.214,
Ls.14-15, p.215, Ls.16-18.) The prosecutor asked those two questions mere moments apart.
(See Tr., Vol.2, p.214, L.14 - p.215, L.18.) It seems strange, then, that the State argues that these
questions need to be assessed “in context” (Resp. Br., pp.12, 25), while analyzing them in
isolation of one another.

(See Resp. Br. pp.11-12 (arguing that the “someone” in the

prosecutor’s first question was only the other person in the car (Ms. Ibarra’s ex-boyfriend,
Mariano Castillo)), pp.12-15 (separately arguing that the question specifically referring to
Ms. Ibarra was only asked to follow up on questions defense counsel asked during his crossexamination regarding his take on her statement claiming ownership of the gun).)
The State’s arguments are mistaken because, in context, it is apparent that the prosecutor
was asking Officer Duke to render his opinion on the question the jury was being asked to
consider – whether Ms. Ibarra had knowledge of, and the ability to control, and thus, possessed,
the gun. And even if his testimony was not directly an opinion on Ms. Ibarra’s guilt, the context
in which the two questions were asked certainly invited the jurors to draw that inference, which
is just as inappropriate.

See State v. Ellington, 151 Idaho 53, 61 (2011) (explaining the

prosecutor had improperly elicited a comment on the defendant’s silence because “the jury was
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likely to infer” that fact from the elicited testimony); State v. Phillips, 144 Idaho 82, 87 (Ct. App.
2007) (explaining that even “subtle and indirect” appeals to the juror’s emotions are enough to
constitute misconduct because they, like their more direct cousins, still deprive the defendant of
a fair trial before an impartial jury).
To the State’s argument on the “someone” question, while it is true that the prosecutor
immediately proceeded to elicit the officer’s opinion regarding Mr. Castillo’s guilt and asked
about the officer’s tactics in interviewing Mr. Castillo, the prosecutor then immediately
proceeded to ask similar questions in regard to the officer’s interview of Ms. Ibarra. (See
Tr., Vol.2, p.214, L.14 - p.215, L.15.) Those questions culminated with the prosecutor asking
whether Officer Duke would have arrested Ms. Ibarra specifically if he believed she did not have
access to or control over the gun. (Tr., Vol.2, p.215, Ls.15-18 (“And if you believed Jessica did
not know about the gun and did not have access to it, would you have arrested her?”).) Since the
prosecutor asked the same follow-up questions in regard to both Ms. Ibarra and Mr. Castillo, the
specific context of the prosecutor’s questions reveals that “someone” referred to Ms. Ibarra just
as much as it referred to Mr. Castillo. As the State concedes, asking such questions about the
defendant’s guilt is improper. (See Resp. Br., p.15.) Therefore, the prosecutor’s questions,
viewed in context, amounted to misconduct.
That conclusion is reinforced by the context of the case overall, since the State’s theme
was that two people could be guilty of possessing the same gun in such circumstances. (See
generally Tr., Vols.2-3.) Thus, it is apparent that the prosecutor was referring to Ms. Ibarra as
much as to Mr. Castillo when he mentioned the hypothetical “someone.”

That line of

questioning was meant to invite the jurors to disregard whatever doubts they may have had from
the facts and trust the officer’s judgment – that, despite his doubts about Ms. Ibarra’s claim to the
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gun, it was his opinion that both occupants of the car were guilty of possessing it. Therefore, the
prosecutor’s questions about their joint guilt still asked for the officer’s opinion on Ms. Ibarra’s
guilt, which means that line of questioning was improper.
Even if the “someone” question did only refer to Mr. Castillo, it still constitutes
misconduct because it still invited the jury to draw the inference about Officer Duke’s opinion of
Ms. Ibarra’s guilt. Under that narrow reading of the question, Officer Duke testified that he does
not arrest people he believes are innocent, and he believed Mr. Castillo was not innocent, so he
arrested him. (Tr., Vol.2, p.214, Ls.14-15.) That naturally leads to the inference that, because
Officer Duke subsequently testified he would not have arrested Ms. Ibarra if he believed she did
not have access to the gun and that he did arrest her, it was his opinion that Ms. Ibarra was also
not innocent since he does not arrest innocent people.

Where the prosecutor’s questions

indirectly invite the jury to infer guilt from impermissible sources, it is still misconduct.
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61; Phillips, 144 Idaho at 86-87.
This remains true even if, as the State suggests, the prosecutor’s intent was to only have
the officer testify to permissible subjects. When there is a high risk that, even with a well-crafted
question, the question would elicit an impermissible opinion or allow the jury to infer the
impermissible opinion, the question still constitutes misconduct.1 See Ellington, 151 Idaho at 61
(rejecting the argument that the prosecutor’s attempt to frame the question in such a way as to
avoid a comment on the defendant’s silence meant there was no misconduct when his question
actually elicited the erroneous testimony).

Prosecutors should not “‘exert their skill and

ingenuity to see how far they can trespass upon the verge of error, [since] generally in so doing

1

The question in this case was not well-crafted to try to limit its impact to Mr. Castillo since it
referred to a hypothetical “someone” which can, as discussed supra, be understood to refer to
Ms. Ibarra as easily as to Mr. Castillo.
6

they transgress upon the rights of the accused.’” Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87 (quoting State v.
Irwin, 9 Idaho 35, 43-44 (1903)). Rather, “‘[i]t is the duty of the prosecutor to see that a
defendant has a fair trial, and that nothing but competent evidence is submitted to the jury, and
above all things he should guard against anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors,
and tend to hinder them from considering only the evidence introduced.’” Id. (quoting Irwin,
9 Idaho at 43-44) (emphasis added); accord State v. Johnson, ___ P.3d ___, slip op. at p.14
(Mar. 16, 2018) (admonishing prosecutors in regard to this duty because, although they have
been repeatedly reminded of it, they still, all too frequently, fail to meet that duty by eliciting
improper testimony from witnesses).
The State effectively concedes that the prosecutor failed in that duty in this case, as it
concedes the prosecutor was treading dangerous waters by asking the officer’s opinion about
people’s guilt or innocence. Specifically, the State acknowledges that, had the prosecutor used
Ms. Ibarra’s name, instead of the hypothetical “someone,” the prosecutor’s question would have
been improper. (Resp. Br., p.15 (“While questions regarding an officer’s beliefs about the
defendant’s guilt would usually be improper . . . .”) (emphasis added); see also Resp. Br., p.9 n.2
(conceding that “[t]he question asked on direct—‘[b]ased on your training and experience, you
believed [the defendant and the driver] were both guilty of this?’, [sic] was objected to, and the
objection was properly sustained.”) (internal citation omitted).) Indeed, the fact that the district
court had already sustained an objection to this line of questioning during the prosecutor’s direct
examination only reinforces the fact that the prosecutor’s decision to re-engage in that line of
questioning on redirect was improper. See Ellington, 151 Idaho at 63 (“The court should not
have to lecture the prosecutor in front of the jury in order to get its point across that the current
line of questioning is inappropriate and the prosecutor should move on to a different one.”).
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Finally, defense counsel’s questions – about whether Officer Duke believed Ms. Ibarra
when she said the gun was hers – did not open the door to allow the prosecutor to ask whether
the officer believed she was, in fact, guilty, of the charged offense. (See Resp. Br., pp.12-15.)
The State ignores a critical distinction between this case and Lankford in arguing to the contrary
– in Lankford, the allegedly-improper statements were made by the prosecutor in his closing
statements, not by another witness during his testimony. See State v. Lankford, 162 Idaho 477,
___, 399 P.3d 804, 224-25 (2017). During closing arguments, prosecutors are allowed to draw
inferences from the evidence, and thus, express their opinions about the truth or falsity of certain
evidence so long as “‘such opinion is based upon the evidence.’” Phillips, 144 Idaho at n.1
(quoting State v. Pizzuto, 119 Idaho 742, 753 n.1 (1991), overruled on other grounds). However,
the Idaho Supreme Court has made it clear that other witnesses, be they lay or expert, are not
allowed to testify as to matters of credibility, and therefore, it has held it is misconduct for the
prosecutor to try to elicit such testimony from witnesses. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 229
(2010).
Thus, in Lankford, because the defense had raised the issue about whether the key
witness in the case was credible, that opened the door for the prosecutor to draw inferences from
the evidence and argue that they showed, in his opinion, the truthfulness of the key witness’s
testimony during his closing arguments. Lankford, 399 P.3d at 825. However, even in Lankford,
it would have still been impermissible for the prosecutor to have elicited another witness’s
opinion that the key witness was being truthful. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 229.
Furthermore, regardless of the issue about the key witness’s credibility, it would have
still been improper for the prosecutor in Lankford to have called another witness to testify that it
was his opinion that Mr. Lankford was guilty of the crime. Yet that is what the State is arguing
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for here – that the officer could properly testify as to whether “he believed Jessica did not know
about the gun and did not have access to it.” (Tr., Vol.2, p.215, Ls.16-18 (emphasis added).)
That question was not asking Officer Duke whether he thought Ms. Ibarra’s statements about
owning the gun were accurate. Rather, it asked him to weigh the evidence in regard to the two
elements of the crime of constructive possession of a firearm, and thus, render an opinion about
Ms. Ibarra’s guilt. That represented a clear attempt to have Officer Duke usurp the jury’s
function, which was wholly improper. Perry, 150 Idaho at 229.
The State even acknowledges that the prosecutor’s question “would usually be
improper.” (Resp. Br., p.15.) That the credibility of Ms. Ibarra’s statements to the officer was
an issue before the jury did not transform that otherwise-improper question into a valid line of
inquiry. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 229. Again, Idaho’s courts have long held that the prosecutor’s
duty is to see that the defendant has a fair trial, “‘and above all things, he should guard against
anything that would prejudice the minds of the jurors.” Phillips, 144 Idaho at 87 (quoting Irwin,
9 Idaho at 43-44) (emphasis added); accord Johnson, slip op. at 14. There was no door to open
to allow the prosecutor to ask a witness that sort of improper question, regardless of whether the
prosecutor might have been able to opine on the truthfulness of Ms. Ibarra’s statements during
her closing arguments. It was misconduct for the prosecutor to ask that question, the third such
question she asked during the trial.

B.

The Misconduct In Eliciting The Officer’s Opinion To The Ultimate Question Amounted
To A Clear Violation Of Ms. Ibarra’s Constitutional Right To A Fair Trial
The State would have this Court ignore the prosecutor’s misconduct in this case based on

its attempt to draw a bright-line rule in regard to the officer’s opinion testimony – that eliciting
such testimony is only ever evidentiary error, never constitutional error.
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(Resp. Br., p.15

(quoting State v. Parker, 157 Idaho 132, 148-49 (2014)).) The State misreads Parker. What
Parker actually said is that “[a] defendant’s constitutional right is not categorically violated by
an evidentiary error.” Parker, 157 Idaho at 148 (emphasis added). Thus, while the error in
Parker may not have risen to the level of a constitutional violation, the Parker Court did not
foreclose the possibility that misconduct which facilitated the erroneous admission of evidence
could violate a constitutional right in a different case.
The Idaho Supreme Court has recently reaffirmed that evidentiary errors can potentially
rise to the level of constitutional error: “evidentiary errors do not implicate constitutional
considerations unless the error results in the defendant being deprived of his or her Fourteenth
Amendment due process right to a fair trial in a fair tribunal.” Lankford, 399 P.3d at 823-24
(internal quotation omitted; emphasis added). In fact, in Ellington, the Supreme Court actually
identified one such situation. In that case, the officer had gratuitously offered an improper
opinion on direct examination, and there was no contemporaneous objection to that testimony.
Ellington, 151 Idaho at 65-67.

Nevertheless, the Supreme Court explained that, “had

Mr. Ellington raised this issue as another instance of prosecutorial misconduct on appeal, we
would have found, once again, that the State’s conduct was improper.” Id. The reason that error,
though evidentiary in nature, could still have been properly challenged for the first time on
appeal is that prosecutorial misconduct of that sort can “impact[] a defendant’s Fourteenth
Amendment right to a fair trial.” Perry, 150 Idaho at 227. Therefore, this Court should reject
the State’s attempt to draw a new bright-line rule which would contradict numerous decisions of
the Idaho Supreme Court.
Looking at the facts of this case, the prosecutor’s misconduct was, like the misconduct in
Ellington, of such a type that it would impact on Ms. Ibarra’s constitutional rights. As numerous
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courts across the country, including the Idaho Court of Appeals, have recognized, there is a
reasonable possibility that the jurors will defer to the officer’s opinion rather than evaluating the
evidence on their own.

(See App. Br., pp.7-8 (identifying all those cases).)

If a jury is

compromised in that manner, the defendant’s constitutional right to a fair trial before an
impartial jury is compromised.
The State offers no rebuttal to the merits of this conclusion. Rather, it merely notes that
several of those other cases discussed that issue under different legal standards or in cases
involving different factual scenarios. (Resp. Br., pp.19-20.) Those distinctions are of little
import. In all those cases, the courts explained that the risk that the improper opinion testimony
had tainted the jury needed to be taken into account, whichever legal framework or factual
situation they were specifically considering. As such, the State’s attempt to distinguish those
cases simply because they do not present mirror images of the facts and issues in this case is
meritless.
Since there is a reasonable possibility that the jurors disregarded their own reasonable
doubts and deferred to Officer Duke’s opinion, there is a reasonable possibility that the verdict in
this case was not the product of a decision by a fair and impartial jury. That impact on
Ms. Ibarra’s constitutional rights is actually emphasized by the facts of this case because, like in
Ellington and unlike in Parker, the prosecutor continued to engage in an improper line of
questioning after the district court had already ruled that such questions were improper. (See
Tr., Vol.2, p.183, Ls.21-24.)

The prosecutor’s repeated eliciting of the officer’s improper

opinion only served to reinforce the officer’s opinion to the jury, making it more likely the jurors
would defer to it. As such, while the misconduct facilitated an evidentiary error in this case, it
rises to the constitutional level.
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C.

Mere Failure To Object Does Not Necessarily Show A Tactical Decision, Especially
When No Tactical Purpose Is Served By Not Objecting
The State contends that this Court should ignore the misconduct in this case based on the

idea that there might have been a strategic reason trial counsel did not object to the second and
third instances of misconduct. (Resp. Br., p.18.) The State suggests that the strategic reason
defense counsel failed to object lay in defense counsel’s cross-examination regarding the
credibility of Ms. Ibarra’s statement to Officer Duke. However, that is mistaken because, as
discussed in Section I(A), supra, that line of questioning is not related to, and so, did not open
the door for the prosecutor to ask about the officer’s opinion about the ultimate issue of
Ms. Ibarra’s guilt. In fact, no defense strategy could be served by allowing the officer to usurp
the jury’s function in this manner because of the well-established risk that reasonable jurors will
actually disregard their own doubts and defer to such opinion testimony.
Instead, defense counsel’s failure to object is simply an example of the realities of trial.
An objection may be overlooked in the heat of trial because the defense attorney is required to
focus on several different aspects of the case, including client management, at once.

The

problem that causes in terms of objecting to a particular question is revealed by the fact that the
determination of whether to object “must usually be made literally on a split second basis” since
“[a] typical question on either direct or cross-examination last less than ten seconds and a long
question will go on for no more than twenty seconds, yet within that time counsel must
recognize, formulate, and evaluate all possible objections.” Steven Lubet, Objecting, 16 Am. J.
Trial Advoc. 213, 218 (Summer 1992). “Even in the computer age of today, however, it is hard
to imagine anyone actually running through all [the relevant] factors in the five to ten seconds
available between the question and response.” Id. at 224. Therefore, all it takes is a momentary
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focus on one of the other balls defense counsel is trying to juggle during a trial for him to miss
the opportunity to object to a particular question.
Perry accounts for those realities by allowing those claims of clear constitutional error to
be raised on appeal even though the trial attorney failed to recognize that issue in the heat of
trial. See Perry, 150 Idaho at 226. As a result, Perry promotes the interests of justice, especially
in cases like this, where the hypothetical strategic decision is actually non-existent.

The

misconduct in this case is, therefore, clear from the face of the record, especially given the
State’s concession that such questions are usually improper.

Therefore, this Court should

address that misconduct.

D.

The Error Was Prejudicial To Ms. Ibarra
The State’s argument on the third prong of the Perry analysis is primarily based on its

perception of the strength of its case in light of Ms. Ibarra’s statement claiming ownership of the
gun. (Resp. Br., pp.19-20.) The State’s perception is misguided, as revealed by the fact that one
of its own prosecutors spent a substantial amount of time successfully impeaching the statement
to which the State now points to as the strong point of its argument. (See Exhibit 42 (audio of
the preliminary hearing in Mr. Castillo’s case, which was played for the jury, and during which
the prosecutor impeached Ms. Ibarra’s statement that the gun was hers alone).) The State’s
primary witness, Officer Duke, expressed similar doubts about the strength of that evidence.
(See, e.g., Exhibit 20.) If both a prosecutor and a police officer can harbor these sort of doubts, a
reasonable juror certainly could.

Thus, the State’s case was not near as strong as it now

contends.
This is also where the impact of the officer’s improper opinion testimony is most
apparent. That testimony invited the jurors to follow his lead and set aside those otherwise-
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reasonable doubts because the officer had already determined they did not matter. Thus, under
the proper standard for analyzing the prejudice prong, given the well-recognized reasonable
possibility that jurors will defer to such opinions from police officers and existence of reasonable
doubts as voiced by the State’s own agents, there is a reasonable possibility that the officer’s
improper opinion testimony affected the outcome of the case.
Since the prosecutor’s misconduct satisfies all three prongs of the Perry test, this Court
should vacate Ms. Ibarra’s conviction in light of that fundamental error.

II.
The District Court Erred By Admitting Propensity Evidence When The State Failed To Provide
The Written Notice Required Under I.R.E. 404(b)
Upon further review of this issue, the State is correct that the identity of the substance in
the pipe would be relevant to the possession of paraphernalia charge regardless of whether it
would be relevant to the possession charge. As such, Ms. Ibarra withdraws the 404(b) issue from
this appeal.

III.
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Ordering Restitution Which Was Solely Based On
The Prosecutor’s Unsworn Statement, Not On Sufficient Evidence
The State does not contest the merits of Ms. Ibarra’s claim that the restitution award was
not supported by sufficient evidence. (See generally Resp. Br.) That is not surprising, since the
Idaho Supreme Court has expressly held that a fill-in-the-blank form identical to the one the
State proffered in this case, which is not sworn and which contains no itemization of the tasks
performed, does not constitute evidence, much less sufficient evidence, to support a restitution
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award under I.C. § 37-2732(k).

State v. Nelson, 161 Idaho 692, 695 (2017); State v.

Cunningham, 161 Idaho 698, 700 (2017).
Rather, the State raises two related procedural arguments – that the sufficiency claim
cannot be raised for the first time on appeal, and that the proper remedy if the evidence is
insufficient is to remand the case to let the State attempt to meet its burden of proof. Both
arguments are mistaken, as they ignore the fact that the district court expressly told the
prosecutor that “the State needs to submit . . . an affidavit in support of the -- the request of the
costs of prosecution and a proposed order and judgment for the court’s signature.” (Tr., p.120,
Ls.15-18.) With Nelson and Cunningham having been issued at that point, it was clear what that
affidavit needed to contain in order for it to satisfy the State’s burden of proof on its motion for
restitution. See Nelson, 161 Idaho at 695; Cunningham, 161 Idaho at 700.
The Rules of Civil Procedure, which are applicable to restitution proceedings because
they are civil in nature, address whether the non-moving party needs to raise the issue of
sufficiency of the evidence to preserve that issue for appeal. See State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758,
762 (Ct. App. 2010) (noting that the general restitution statute specifically recognizes the
applicability of those Rules in I.C. § 19-5304(10)). Those Rules expressly state that the answer
is “no”: “The failure of a party to move for a directed verdict,[2] for a judgment notwithstanding
the verdict or for a new trial does not preclude appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence
when proper assignment of error is made in the appellate court.” I.R.C.P. 50(b)(3); accord
State v. Ashley, 126 Idaho 694, 695-96 (Ct. App. 1994); see also State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho
871, 873 (Ct. App. 2007) (explaining that, while a challenge to the admission of certain evidence

2

A directed verdict is appropriate when the evidence submitted by the party bearing the burden
of proof is insufficient to prove their claim. See Sanders v. Kuna Joint Sch. Dist., 125 Idaho 872,
874 (Ct. App. 1994).
15

may require a contemporaneous objection, a challenge that the admitted evidence was not
sufficient to prove the claim being made does not).3
Therefore, particularly given the district court’s express statement that the State needed to
present an affidavit to support its motion for restitution, Ms. Ibarra was not required to move for
a directed verdict based on the insufficiency of the State’s evidence in order to raise the issue of
insufficient evidence on appeal.

I.R.C.P. 50(b)(3). As such, Ms. Ibarra’s argument – that the

fill-in-the-blank form, which was all the State offered in support of its claim for restitution, is not
sufficient to prove the State’s actual loss (App. Br., pp.13-16) – is properly considered for the
first time on appeal.
Furthermore, since the State bears the burden to prove its actual losses in this context, the
lack of evidence weighs against the State. See Nelson, 161 Idaho at 695; Cunningham, 161
Idaho at 700. Thus, the State bears the obligation to bring evidence to the district court’s
attention in the first instance. Compare State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho 201, 203 (2007) (explaining
that, because the defendant bears the burden of proof in regard to motions for leniency, he must

3

Though the State does not mention State v. Kelley, the Idaho Supreme Court’s decision in
Kelley does not demand a different conclusion. See State v. Kelley, 161 Idaho 686, 689 n.1
(2017). The Supreme Court’s primary reason for refusing to consider the sufficiency argument
in that case was that the defendant “did not raise that issue in the briefing.” Id. Because the
appellant in that case had not provided argument or authority on that point prior to the hearing on
review, he had waived that issue for appeal. See Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 168 (2014).
Thus, the subsequent part of the Kelley Court’s statement – about the issue not being raised in the
district court and there not being an adverse ruling – is dicta because it was not necessary to
resolve the issue. That is especially true in light of the fact that, in Kelley, the Supreme Court did
not have briefing regarding the propriety of raising a sufficiency claim for first time no appeal.
See id; State v. Barton, 154 Idaho 289, 294 (2013) (Horton, J., concurring) (explaining that the
Court should not address issues without first receiving “input from interested parties”). Here,
however, the preservation question is squarely presented in the appellate briefing, and there is an
adverse ruling – the district court’s acceptance of the fill-in-the-blank affidavit as sufficient to
satisfy the State’s burden of proof. Therefore, even in light of Kelley, this Court should consider
Ms. Ibarra’s challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence the State presented in regard to its
request for restitution, especially since the civil rules expressly authorize it to do so.
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provide new or additional information for the district court’s consideration, or else his motion
should be denied); State v. Fortin, 124 Idaho 323, 328 (Ct. App. 1993) (requiring that the
defendant moving for leniency present his evidence or make an offer of proof with the motion
itself).
The State’s argument on appeal would essentially flip the burdens in this regard. It
would affirmatively relieve the State of its burden of proof, presuming that restitution will be
awarded based on the State’s mere request, unless the defendant makes a sufficient showing
(bears the burden) that the restitution is improper. At that point, the district court would be
obligated to reopen the evidentiary portion of the proceedings for the State finally to present its
evidence. That is not how the burden of proof on such motions works. See, e.g., Tucek v. Huff,
115 Idaho 905, 907 (Ct. App. 1983) (explaining the reason courts do not usually reopen hearings
is “to protect the integrity of the [hearing] and encourage[] the parties to marshall [sic] their
evidence in a timely fashion.”); cf. Huffman, 144 Idaho at 203; Fortin, 124 Idaho at 328.
Therefore, the district court in this case expressly gave the State its first bite at the apple
when it told the prosecutor, in no uncertain terms, that it needed to provide the district court with
evidence supporting its motion for restitution. (Compare Resp. Br., p.31 (arguing that “the
proverbial apple was never on the menu, much less bitten [because Ms.] Ibarra waited until
appeal to challenge the restitution”).) The district court waited, giving the State two weeks to
meet its burden before it entered the restitution order. (See R., pp.85-86.) However, the
prosecutor did not file an affidavit during that time, choosing to rely only on the unsworn fill-inthe-blank form instead. (See R., pp.77-86; see generally R.) The State’s first bite at the apple,
then, was its attempt to meet its burden by providing only the unsworn fill-in-the-blank form.
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Because the State chose not to submit any evidence during that first opportunity to meet
its burden of proof, it should not now be given a second chance to do so. It should not be given a
second bite at that apple. In other words, this case is more like Nelson than Cunningham in
terms of the appropriate remedy. See Nelson, 161 Idaho at 697 (refusing to remand a case when
the State had chosen to rely only on the fill-in-the-blank form after being given the opportunity
to marshal and present additional evidence); see also State v. McNeil, 158 Idaho 280, 286
(Ct. App. 2014) (simply vacating the portions of the restitution award which were not supported
by sufficient evidence); cf. Tucek, 115 Idaho at 907.
Like in Nelson and McNeil, this Court should simply vacate the restitution award because
the State had the opportunity to meet its burden of proof the first time around. There is no just
reason to reopen the restitution hearing because, when the prosecutor was expressly given the
opportunity to marshal her evidence, she chose to ignore the Idaho Supreme Court precedent on
point and not present additional information to support the request for restitution.

CONCLUSION
Ms. Ibarra respectfully requests this Court vacate her judgments of conviction and
remand these cases for a new trial. Alternatively, she respectfully requests this Court vacate the
portions of the restitution award which are not supported by sufficient evidence.
DATED this 10th day of April, 2018.

_________/s/________________
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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